CHECHNYA: TOWARDS PARTITION?

Viatcheslav AVIOUTSKII

Chechnya is situated in the Eastern part of the Northern Caucasus. Its area is 16,6 thousand km2. Chechnya borders Georgia in the South, Daghestan in the East (Russian Federation), Ingushetia (Russian Federation) and Northern Ossetia in the West (Russian Federation), and Stavropol Territory in the North (Russian Federation). In spite of the proclamation of the Chechnya's independence by General Jokhar Doudayev, elected Chechen President in october 1991, Chechnya was not officially recognized by any state. Only the taliban movement recognized this republic , but untill 2000 the talibans were recognized only by Pakistan.

Untill 1991 Chechnya had been part of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic, member of the Russian Federation. In 1989, Chechnya-Ingushetia's total population was 1 270 000 persons. Chechen were the majority group - 735 000 persons, or 57,8% of the total population. Russians were concentrated mostly in the administrative capital of Chechnya-Ingushetia, Grozny, and in the North of the Republic. They constituted 23,1% of the population (294 000 persons). Ingushs were 12,9% of the population (164 000 persons) and occupied the Western part of Chechnya-Ingushetia ; in 1992 they split off from Chechnya-Ingushetia, creating an Ingush Republic. Unlike the Chechen, Ingushs did not take part in the Caucasian War in the 19th century, and at present they don't want to split off from the Russian Federation. If they make an effort, Chechen and Ingushs can understand each other, because both belong to the same group of North-Western Caucasus languages. On the other hand, their language is not intelligible for Daghestanis, some of whose languages belong to this group too. The Chechen are the most numerous ethnic group of the Northern Caucasus. They outnumber Avars of Daghestan (496 000), Kabards (364 000) and the Northern Ossetes (335 000).

The Chechen were converted into Islam in the 18th century by Daghestanis. Like other Moslem ethnic groups of the Northern Caucasus, such as Adyges, Shapsugues, Cherkesss, Kabardins, Abazas, Karachais, Balkars, Nogays, Ossetes Digors and Daghestani ethnic groups, they are Sunni. If only ten mosques were active in Chechnya-Ingushetia before 1985, their number was 175 in 1991, and several hundred in the mid-1990s. Their construction was financed by the Gulf "oil monarchies", essentially by Saudi Arabia.

It's important to distinguish two meanings of the term "Chechnya", that have changed over the centuries. Untill 1917, it means "the country of Chechen", the territory where the Chechen live. There were even subdivisons: "Little Chechnya" and "Greater Chechnya"; "Plain's Chechnya" and "Mountain's Chechnya". However, this term becomes purely administrative after the formation, on 20 january 1921, of an Chechen Autonomous District inside of the Mountain ASSR , (ASSR's constituent ethnic groups were Kabardins, Balkars, Karachais, Northern Ossetes, Ingushs, Chechen, Cossacks and Russians). On 30 november 1922, the Chechen Autonomous Region is organised. It was larger than Chechen Autonomous District. The AR included the lands of four Cossack communities, that had belonged to the Sunzha Cossack District, member of the Mountain ASSR . In 1928, the Sunzha Cossack District is shared among the Chechen and Ingush ARs, while the Chechen AR received the mainly Russian Autonomous City of Grozny, that became the administrative capital of the Chechen AR. From then the Chechen AR became a pluriethnic administrative unit.

In 1937, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (Chechen and Ingush units united in 1934) numbered 189 000 Russians, 34.6% of the Republic's population . In 1957, two districts in the North of the Terek, Shelkovski and Naurski, mainly with Russian population, were included in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, restored after the Chechen and Ingush return from exile. Thereafter, the Russian population reduced gradually: 367 000 in 1970 (34.5% of the total population), 336 000 in 1979 (29.1% of the total population), 294 000 in 1989 (23.1% of the total population) . In 1989, other ethnic minorities were living in Chechnya-Ingushetia : Armenians (14 800 persons), Ukrainians (12 600 persons), Kumyks (9 800 persons), Nogais (6 800), Avars (6 200), Tatars (5 100), Jews (2 600) .

During the Soviet period, the term "Chechnya" is first applied to an Autonomous District, then to an Autonomous Region, later to an Autonomous Republic, and finally from 1991, to a self-proclaimed "independent" Republic, where Chechen were only one of the ethnic groups, though majority group (in 1989, 57,8% of the total population of Chechnya-Ingushetia ).

In the first case ("Chechnya" - "country of Chechen"), was an ethnopolitical or ethnoterritorial term. In the second case ("Chechnya" - "administrative unit of the RSFSR or of the Russian Federation", a "self-proclaimed independent Republic"), was an administrative term. In the first case, "Chechnya" was an ethnic territory, that corresponded exactly to geographical space, occupied by the Chechen. In the second case, "Chechnya" was an administrative unit with the more or less artificial limits, created by the Soviet rÚgime. Its increasing doesn't correspond necessarily to the widening of the "living zone" of Chechen.

If Chechen clans were united by the same language, the same history, the same traditions and the same way of life, other inhabitants of the Chechen administrative unit share with the Chechen only a part of the territory of this Republic (for example, Russians, Kumyks, Armenians, Nogais, Mountain Jews). What is more characteristic of Chechen history, the Russians and the Cossacks of Chechnya-Ingushetia are considered as eternal ennemis, invaders, expropriators and organizers of Stalin's deportations in 1957. The Chechen political project can be based only on conflictual opposition to Russia and on expulsion of a large Russian community from the political life, which just led to the exodus in 1991-1994. The populist anti-Moscow anti-Russian rhetoric of Chechen leaders after 1991 was proof of this nationalist "drifting". This rhetoric could become progressist or anticolonial at the Russian Federation level (an ethnic minority claiming self-determination), but at the Republic level it was chauvinistic towards the Russian minority (slogans of 1991 in Grozny: "Russians, don't leave, we need slaves!"). Following the general election of october 1991, there was only one Russian deputy in the Chechen parliament while the Russians were absent in government, Presidential and Republican administration, in leadership of the police and of the armed forces.

This expulsion according to ethnic criteria was applied not only to the Russian community but as well to the other ethnic minorities. More than 30 000 Ingushs of Grozny left this city, like Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians and Jews. Between January and August 1993, for example, 25 000 persons, mainly Russians, left the Chechen Republic. Only four Jewish families remained in Grozny in August 1993, while the Jewish community still numbers more than 2 000 persons in 1989 . In the past a mainly Russian city, Grozny numbers at present only several hundred persons of Russian origin.

Chechen are an mountain ethnic group, and they call themselves "mountain dwellers". Mountain collective identity (common history, tradition and culture) subsists today, and mountain ethnic groups are different, for example, from steppe ethnic groups of the Northern Caucasus. This designation means the Chechen are natives of mountains, or at least mountains are their historical lands. Until now, they possess in the mountains their cemeteries, reserved for members of the same teype . But now, only 20% of the Chechnya's territory is mountain, which was during centuries the Chechen ethnic "cradle". The rest of the territory is composed by piemont, probably 20%, while 60% of the territory is composed of steppe, desert and valleys, that were in the past occupied by Kabardins, then by Cossacks and Russians.

This is the main reason of the Chechen conflict, which indeed is first of all an ethno-territorial conflict. An ethnic group (Chechen), based on its demographic weight and on its economic rights (confusion between "Chechnya - Chechen Republic" and "Chechnya - country of Chechen"), decided to split off from the large and complex geopolitical bloc, that is the Russian Federation (composed by more than 100 ethnic groups). Nevertheless, the Chechen ethnic limits don't correspond to the administrative borders of Chechnya (administrative unit). An amicable divorce is not in fact possible, because both actors of this conflict claim the same territory. Moscow fights Chechen for two zones: the Sunzha valley (oil deposits and industry) and the Terek valley (historical Cossack community and important road axis). It is evident that without industry, deposits and road axis, that are the Chechen Republic's only wealth, the Chechen has no chance of acceding to real independence from Russia. Moscow believes that oil industry, roads and deposits have been developped thanks to the common efforts of all the Soviet people, therefore the rightful heir is the Russian people (all the inhabitants of the Russian Federation). The ethnic and administrative borders' question (and its numerous changes) is at the centre of the Chechen conflict. If we want to study this conflict, it's necessary to analyse the geographical position of the conflict's actors and to situate geographically ethnic groups, clans and rivalry. Then, it's necessary to study the events that can shed light on relations between actors, fighting for the territory (Suja and Terek valleys). Finally, it's necessary to find explanations of this rivalry and to forsee future development of the situation.

Every conflict is moved by "representations", sort of images that are often false. But these representations mobilize masses to realize a political project. These representations can be based on history (transformed into legend but majestic), on tragedy (disproportionate but common for all the people, and therefore unifying), and on an enemy's vision ("more the enemy is dangerous, more we must be strong"). In some cases, we have to study the conflict in historical retrospect, but this retrospect has to be always linked to the current events. For example, Chechen separatists refer constantly to the Caucasian War, to the Shamil's Imamate and to Stalin's deportations, in aiming to rub out clan opposition and to unite the forces in order to resist against Russian aggression. For its part, Moscow exalts the Cossack past of the Chechnya's Russians, in quoting abundantly from General Yermolov, who had massacred and pacified Caucasian montaineers during the Caucasian War in the 19th century. He stated : "Gentleness is a sign of weakness in the eyes of Asians [...] and I'm inexorably severe. The execution of a mountaineer saves the lives of hundreds of Russians and prevents thousands of Moslems from betrayal." . In the quality of "ghost commander", the General is still present in the Russian-Chechen confrontation, sustaining the hatred of one and encouraging the other. Having an ordinary ruler in hand and almost alone, Yermolov concieved the well-known Cossack lines, kind of "dams", isolating the mountaineers from their mountains, that are difficult to get into, and cutting them off from every contact with Russian farmers-settlers. For their part, the mountaineers were not less categorical. Imam Shamil rote for example to the ottoman sultan : "...But the expressions of Russians are false, and their words are lies. We must destroy what they build and kill them wherever they were: at home or in fields, using force or cunning, in order that their swarms dissappear from the face of the earth. Because they multiply as lice, and they are poisonous as the snakes that crawl in the Muhan desert."

The heritage of that war and of the defeat inflicted to Chechen by Russians and Cossacks, is still present. Although it is more than three hundred years old, the Chechen-Cossack warlike relationship is not unfortunately part of the past composed of just folklore and legends, and the deportation of the Chechen in 1944 made more decisive the break-up between Chechen and Russians. The Chechnya Cossacks (known as "Terek Cossack Host"), lived from the late 18th century on the banks of the Terek-river, considered a part of present Chechnya territory and as their historical lands, disputed also by Chechen.

Geographical survey.

As we have already said, the territory of the present Chechen Republic is composed of three distinct parts: mountains, piedmont and plain.

Montains.
The economy of the mountains is based on breeding. The life in this zone is developped in high valleys, where the population is largely concentrated. Mountain communities are isolated from each other. Great expert on the Caucasus, General Komarov wrote in the 19th century: "Almost every depression, every separate valley is inhabited by a distinct tribe, that often has nothing in common with the neighbouring tribes. Where the mountains become more accessible, the tribal diversity reduces, while the number of inhabitants and the space they occupy become more important". The breeding in the mountains is done in the framework of bi-annual migration and the pastures are divided into winter and summer pastures. As the winter pastures were situated in the plain, controlled by Kabardins, the Chechen and other mountaineers (Ossetes and Balkars in particular) became vassals of the Kabardin princes.

In a very picturesque way, George DumÚzil described the life of mountain societies : "The raids practised, the boisterous activity of young men constantly on horseback, the mortal risks of daily life in the auls (mountain villages) or villages, the moral based on rich archaic legends and maintained by songs of praise and on mockery have exalted everywhere the liking for excentric and paradoxical behaviours. All that, added to the economic conditions, doesn't favour mountaineers seeking prestige in paraded and stabilized wealth, or in the luxury of dwellings: they offer enormous feasts, perpetual hospitality, a generous munificence indeed without limit, they are brave in fighting and speak skillfully about the quality of arms and about the beauty of horses (and wives) to satisfy all the appearance-consciousness of the great men. While the Caucasus remained isolated, this ideal, exactly realized, could maintain. The anarchy got on well with the independence" .

Geographically, the Chechen tribes occupied the valleys upstream from the Sunzha and Aksa´ tributaries, situated towards the West of the boundary of the Avar and Kumyk water zones in the basin of the Sulak - Andi´skoye Koysu. From East to West, the valleys of the tributaries, occupied by Chechen are: Yaraksu, Yamansu, Benoyasi, Aksay, Michik, Gansol, Gums, Okholitlau, Kharachoy, Elistanji, Bass, Sharoargun, Argun, Martan, Gekhi, Valerik, Shalaja, Netkho´. Fortanga is the frontier between Chechen and Ingush countries. It seems that the birthplace of the Chechen ethnic group is situated to the East of the Chechen mountain zone, bordering on Daghestan, from which the Chechen ancestors came. The raison for this migration was probably dissidence by some Daghestani families, that moved on during 10th-12th centuries. These dissident families settled in the place presently named "Ichkeria" (Dargo - Vedeno). The Chechen constituted a warrior society. In addition to the pastoralism, they found a large part of their income in raids, directed mostly against their Daghestani neighbours and against Georgian principalities in Transcaucasus as well. With the formation of Cossack villages in the Caucasian Piemont, the Chechen warriors began to pillage their new neighbours. If incursions were almost a part of the daily life of Cossacks, the capture of women, children and men, and their sale the Ottoman slave markets, provoked mobilization, upon the initiative of Terek and Kuban Cossack communities, of the Russian imperial troops, that from the 18th century began more and more to be sent into the Northern Caucasus.

According to accounts by Russian officers present in the region during this period, the Russian military presence could be explained by the multiplication of the mountaineers' incursions against Cossack villages, but also against Russian merchant convoys passing in transit toward Persia via the Derbent road. It is in this period (late 18th - early 19th centuries) that the Russian command began to develop the Georgian Military Road, which could provide a way of access to the Persian market through the Great Caucasus, but also to the Georgian principalities, that had asked to be placed under Russian protection.

It is necessary to add that the high mountain, populated once densely, is nearly empty today, especially in its Western part. After the return of the Chechen from their exile of Central Asia in 1957, the Russian authorities united them in the big villages of the Piedmont, in populations of 5 000 - 10 000 inhabitants, whereas the high mountain villages had 200-1000 persons. Today, 10-15% of the total number of Chechen live in the mountainous zone. A very large number of them is concentrated in Ichkeria. It is interesting to note that the Road of Argun, joining the Chechen separatists to their rear bases in Georgia, is quite poorly populated in its mountainous section.

In 1998-1999, the Chechen fundamentalist leaders (Bassayev, Udugov) multiplied their statements, saying that in the past Chechnya and Daghestan were the same politcal space. It's true that during the Caucasian War in the 19th century, Itchkeria was a part of the Imamate of Shamil that included also a part of the Daghestani high mountain zone. In that period, passes allowed to control all these high mountain's valleys without transiting via the plain. The 1999 incursion of Bassayev into Daghestan showed that the Chechen were continuing their project of reunification with Avars in order to obtain an access via the Sulak basin towards the Caspian Sea.

Piedmont.
To the South of Sunzha, of Grozny and of Gudemes, many Chechen villages, extended in 1957, were situated in a rich land strip, limited in the South by forests. The descent into the plain began long before the arrival of Russians in the Northern Caucasus. Some historians affirm that there had been Chechen villages on Sunzha, whereas their lands extended to Terek in the North. Unlike their presence in the plain, the Piedmont was occupied by Chechen more systematically and continuously. There was more of a half of the Chechen population, mainly agrarian.

Plain
.
The plain can be divided in two parts: the Terek valley and the Sunzha valley. The left Terek bank contains a strip of rich lands about 10 kilometers wide. In the North, the steppe changes gradually into desert. Populations are concentrated in Cossack villages spread along the river. Beyond the Terek left bank, there are only hamlets. During the Soviet time, some attemps had been undertaken to irrigate better the Terek left bank. Thus, several channels have been constructed and linked to Terek, permitting in this way to extend the cultivated lands. For example, near Mekenskaya-Naurskaya, the inhabitable area was extended by 20 kilometers to the North of the river. In its plain, Terek is not very wide: in its Chechen section, its width is between 100 and 250 meters, with a depth of 2 to 3 meters. Many fords with a great number of small islands permit to cross the river. Cossack stanitsas have been placed in the easiest places to cross, which permitted, in the 19th century, to control more efficiently the highlanders' crossing of the river. Certainly, TÚrek could not have constituted an impenetrable barrier, as Russian generals wished, but nevertheless, the Cossack line on this river permitted to reduce the range of the mountaineers' raids that went down into the plain in search of loot and booty. Cossack populations settled for a very long time on the Terek left bank. They took part directly in fighting, being on the side of Russians during the Caucasian War; this is unlike the Cossack of Sunzha, that settled quite late in the region, in 1840-1860. Cossacks of the Terek valley (in this Chechen zone, known under the name of Grebentsy, Cossacks of the Crests) constituted the most ancient Cossack population of the region. Let's repeat it: they consider the Terek valley as their historic land, and ideologically it is the only proof of the ancient and continuous presence of Russians in Chechnya. What is more, the Grebentsy partly adopted the mountaineers' clothing and, during some periods, they lived together peacefully with the Chechen and often integrated them in their communities. During the last two wars, the Grebentsy preferred to not participate in the clashes, adopting a neutral attitude in the conflict. Cossacks, present on the side of the Russian military during the armed actions came generally from other parts of the Terek Cossack Host or from other regions of the Northern Caucasus. An exodus certainly weakened communities of Grebentsy in North Terek, but apart from some exceptions, they were not evicted or put under pressure by local Chechen. The reason for their departure can be explained by an especially catastrophic economic situtation. Two districts are to be found in the North Terek area: Shelkovski and Naurski. The Terek Cossack, native of other regions and Republics of the Northern Caucasus, ask to incoporate their lands into the Territory of Stavropol. These two districts are however invested with a strategic importance, because their territory is crossed by main railways Rostov-Bakou and Rostov-Astrakhan, whereas since 1997, the Bakou-Astrakhan railroad bypasses Karlan-Yurt toward Kizliar, (North of Daghestan) the territory of the Chechen Republic. The railway Rostov-Bakou crosses the Terek close to Chervlennaya to rejoin near Gudermes the southern doubling of this trajectory: Prokhladny (Kabardino-Balkaria) - Beslan (Northern Ossetia), - Nazran (Ingushetia) - Grozny (Chechnya) - Gudermes (Chechnya). Three main bridges link the Terek left bank to the rest of Chechnya: Ichsherski bridge (near to Ichsherskaya), Chervlenny bridge (near to Chervlennaya) and Grebesnkoy bridge (near to Grebenskaya). They alone are used by armored vehicles, which explains a lot of fighting for these bridges and their multiple reconstruction. Besides that, the Ichsherski bridge has been very important to link the stronghold of pro-Russian Chechen of the District Nadterechny to Russian-Cossack districts (Naurski and Shelkovski) "allied" with the pro-Russian Chechen, whereas the Grebenskoy bridge permitted the access to the North of Chechnya for the federal troops, situated in Daghestan.

Another part of the plain is the Sunzha valley, that alone concentrates the totality of the Republic's industry and oil deposits. A strong Russian presence in this valley can explain the formation, according to the General Yermolov's plan, of a Cossack line on Sunzha, that had to link two main Russian fortresses in the region, Vladikavkaz and Grozny. Two relatively low mountain chains separate the Sunzha valley from the land "strip" occupied by Chechen on the Terek right bank. This Chechen community has been known during the different periods such as "Chechen of the plain", "peaceful Chechen" or "Nadterechny's Chechen" (Nadterechie means "Terek country"). These Chechen chose during the War of the Caucasus to not participate in the war and have been installed by the Russian military authorities in the immediate proximity of Cossack stanitsas, whereas the Sujna line had to not only block the Chechen mountaineers in their mountains but also to isolate two Chechen communities one from the other.

In the 19th century oil deposits were discovered near Grozny and in the low mountains situated between Terek and Sunzha. The development of oil production in the early 20th century and notably dduring the soviet period explains the arrival of Russian manpower in Chechnya. In 1917 the restrictions on free circulation for the Chechen, introduced by the Tsarist governement, were revoked. But the Chechen remained excluded from the oil extraction industry activities. They were mainly agricultural workers. Later, the Chechen elite would feel excluded from sharing in the oil income, considering therefore that the Republic was exploited by Moscow. The ethnic composition of the Sunzha valley was exclusively Russian before 1917, but it changed considerably in the soviet time. The population of several Cossack stanitsas was entirely deported. In some others stanitsas, the Chechen quickly constituted the majority. By 1989, Chechnya's Russian community was mainly urban and mostly concentrated in Grozny and Gudermes. In the countryside, Russian Cossacks were present in the North of Terek and in some villages of the Sunja Cossack enclave. This enclave disappears by the mid-1990s. Russians considered Grozny to be a Russian city, notably in virtue of the monument to General Yermolov erected on the central square. This city had not a lot of differences from Russia's European cities, with a theater and buildings in the soviet style. Grozny was surrounded by refineries and chemist factories, it was more linked to "Russian" regions than to Chechnya's rural zones, populated by Chechen. The city constitued a Russian enclave in the Sunzha valley, dominated by the Chechen.

The historic survey.

In the history of the difficult relations between Chechen and Russians, two episodes are central: the War of the Caucasus (in the 19th century) and the deportation of Chechen by Stalin to Kazakhstan and to Kirguizstan (1944-1957), in fact these two episodes were exploited to create the very strong representations that mobilize the Chechen in their struggle for the independence.

The first contacts between Chechen and Russians date to the early 18th century. The name "Chechen" has been assigned by Russians in homage to their victory over the Chechen near one of their main villages (Greater Chechen or Bolshoy Chechen), on July 11, 1730: the Russian cavalry, commanded by Prince Volkonski and helped by Terek Cossacks, defeated Ottoman troops, helped by Chechen. Among them, the Chechen are called Nakhtcho. The Russian officers gave some very negative characteristics to the Chechen, that corresponded more to Russian reprÚsentations and propaganda about Chechen, than to the reality. However, this perspective can help understand the deep grounds of the conflict. For example, in the 18th century, the commander in chief of Russian troops in the Caucasus, General Potemkin, wrote with a certain cynicism: "The Chechen are a people that, by reason of ferocious inclinations, can never remain quiet and on the contrary renew at the first opportunity insolent hostile actions. The only way to stop them from committing [these actions] is either to wipe them out entirely, in sacrificing a considerable part of Russian troops, or to seize the plain that they need for breeding or agriculture". Major-General Modom asked Empress Catherine the Great for forgiveness for the Chechen, and received the following answer: "Unlike other people who, even though they continue to pillage [our villages], at least attempt to hide that, the Chechen pillage openly and even boast of their robberies, that why they don't deserve that the Empress address herself directly to them" (which meant that the Empress had not wished to forgive them). However, such violent actions as abductions, plundering, robbery, that were criticized a lot by Russians, were an integral part of the daily life of Chechen society, that lives on in large part thanks to its warriors. The interdiction by Russia, of raids weakened the Chechen economy and was interpreted by Chechen as the restriction of theirs fundamental liberties. Another description of the Chechen was made by a Russian officer, in the 19th century: "The permanent struggle against neighboring ethnic groups, plundering and the very reduced liking for work, all that developped Chechen bravery, cruelty, skilfulness and ingenuity. To these qualities, the vigorous and wild Chechen added cunning, hypocrisy and treachery. It is difficult to trust a Chechen, it is impossible to believe in his promises and vows. He can always betray, he is always capable to be seduced by a doubtful adventure, by a profit of the opportunity or by a loot. However, it is necessary to recognize that the Chechen is hospitable, very moderate in his needs, and respects the elders. He is a skilfull rider and warrior, and in favorable conditions, he can become a good worker" .

The Russian intervening in the Northern Caucasus began in 1783, after the signing of the Gueorguievsk's treaty, according to which Georgia was placed under the Russian protectorate. The first anti-russian rebellion was conducted by a certain She´kh Mansur, that succeeds in resisting, from 1785 to 1791, against the Russian army. This rebellion spread through all Chechnya, Daghestan and the Cherkessia. In June 1791, Russian General Gudovich, during the Russian-Turkish war, occupied Anapa and captured Mansur. Condemned to life in prison, he died in the SchlŘsselbourg fortress on April 13, 1794.

The War of The Caucasus.
In 1822, another Chechen rebellion began, conducted by Kadyr Abdul, who spread rumours that in four months the Ottomans would have to intervene in the Caucasus. In 1825, a new Chechen insurrection, conducted by Be´bulat Tamazov took place.

In 1825, a certain Kazi-Mulla, naqshband sufi from Guimry (Daghestan), proclaimed himself imam. He fought Russians during seven years. At the same time, he preached among Moslems the instauration of the sharia. After some successes, Kazi-Mulla was surrounded October 17, 1832 in his native village and killed along with a large number of his supporters. A certain Shamil was among those who succeeded in escaping. In 1832, one of Kazi-Mulla's lieutenants, Gamzat-Bek, a native from Gotsatl, settled in the Avar Khanat, proclaimed himself the second imam and continued the jihad. However, he was killed by someone of his inner circle, probably because of a vendetta. In 1834, Shamil was proclaimed the third imam. During twenty-five years, he conducted the war against the Russian army. He succeeded in creating a semi-military state, known under the name of "Shamil imamate". The imamate occupied a large Chechen territory and the high Avar mountains. The imamate possessed its own politcal structure, legislation and armed forces. After many failures in direct clashes, the Russian soldiers changed tactics, concentrating their efforts on destruction of Chechen and Avar villages, on burning fields of wheat and on seizing livestock. Gradually, Shamil lost his base. On August 25, 1859, he was surrounded in Gunib and surrendered to Russians to avoid slaughter of inhabitants of the village. Shamil was received with pomp and ceremony by emperor Alexander II in person in Saint-Petersbourg. He was transferred later with his family to Kaluga. Towards the end of his life, Shamil got permission to make a hadj to the holy places of Islam - Mecca and Medina where he died in 1871. After the Russian victory over Shamil, in 1864-1865, 39 000 Chechen emigrated to the Ottoman empire . It seems that the Chechen left their lands, under the Russian authorities' pressure, surrendering these arable lands to the Cossacks of the Sunzha's lineage. Another reason for this massive departure towards the Ottoman Empire (nearly 15% of the total number of Chechen), that coincided with the great transfers of Cherkesse tribes from the West of the Northern Caucasus to Anatolia, was the creation of the Sunzha Cossack Line as a result of Russian military progression on the Grozny-Vladikavkaz axis. The Chechen of Sunja valley were systematically evicted from their lands, that were a principal source of their incomes, so these 39 000 Chechen took temporary refuge in high mountains and left for the Ottoman empire at the first opportunity.

Second World War and deportation by Stalin.
The first rebellion of the soviet time took place in Chechnya and Daghestan in September 1920. It was put down in May 1921, after the defeat of the main rebel forces and the interruption of aid from Georgia, where, in February 1921, soviet power was established. On January 20, 1921, a Chechen District appeared as an integral part the Mountain ASSR. November 30, 1922, a Chechen Autonomous Region was organized on the basis of the Chechen District, having been separated from the Mountain ASSR. It was united in 1934 with an Ingush Autonomous Region. December 5, 1936, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region was transformed into an Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic .

The rebellion was almost continous in the Chechen mountains. July 31, 1925, the Revolutionnary Council of the North-Caucasian Military District took the decision to disarm the population of the "mountainous Chechnya and of its most dangerous districts". The Council mobilized for this operation important forces : 7 000 soldiers, 24 guns, 240 machine guns and 7 airplanes. The result of the operation permitted the seizure of 23.044 rifles, 3902 revolvers and of a large amount of ammunition .

In 1932, during the collectivization campaign, the Soviet authorities displayed too much diligence. On March 23, 1932, a new mutiny began in Chechnya. On March 27, the 28th division was transferred to Grozny, and On March 28 it intervened in order to put down the rebellion. Toward April 5, 1932, the rebel forces were liquidated. The command of the division indicated in a report that rebels had resisted with a particular ferocity. The report noted that even women fought by the side of men, that attacked in close ranks, singing the zikr .

February 23, 1944, Day of the Red Army, all the Chechen and Ingushes were deported in wagons to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. This decision had been taken by the State Defense Committee and was confirmed later by the decree of the Praesidium of the USSR's Supreme Soviet on March 7, 1944. Three days before the deportation, on February 20 the minister of the interior Lavrenti Beria arrived by special train to Grozny to supervise in person the deportation. According to the telegram, sent by Beria personally to Stalin, 352 000 persons were boarded onto the 86 trains. March 1st, Beria reported to Stalin that the number of deported Ingushs and Chechen reached 478 000 people, sent to Kazakhstan in 177 trains. The NKVD committed a lot of atrocities during the deportation. Because of snowfall, the military trucks could not reach one high mountain village called Khaybakh, and it was impossible to deport its inhabitants. Soldiers locked the latter into stables and burned alive about seven hundred civilians, including women and children. The deportation was total and it touched practically all the Chechen. The Chechen-Akkintsy from Daghestan, the Kistins (Georgian Chechen), and Chechen officers and soldiers who were on the front were deported in addition to the Chechen of Chechnya. Only, June 25, 1946, the RSFSR's Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on the dissolution of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, accusing the Chechen of collaboration with the Wehrmacht. Until now, in spite of a lot of studies on this question, the exact and complete grounds of this deportation are not known.

A Soviet dissident of Chechen origin, emigrated to the West, A. Avturkhanov, considers that the motives of the North-Caucasian mountain deportations were : "1. The permanent struggle for the national independence of mounaineers and their rejection of the despotic system of the colonial soviet regime. 2. The will of Moscow to reinforce the Caucasus in future confrontations with the West. 3. The will of the Soviet government to control the Caucasian oil economy. 4. The will to make of the Caucasus a strategic basis, invulnerable from the inside, for future expansion against Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India" .

Some observers indicated that Stalin wished to offer to his compatriots new pastures. Indeed, Georgia hastened to annex high mountain pastures of the Great Caucasus, after the deportation of the Moslem populations of the Northern slopes of the chain, whereas the weight of the Georgians was traditionally considerable in the soviet direction (Stalin, Orjonikidze and Beria were native of Georgia).

With regard to the supposed collaboration of the Chechen with Germans during the Second World War, the opening of the KGB archives during the perestroyka, permitted the revelation of many documents on anti-Soviet activities in Chechnya during in 1941-1944. Two different activities were observed in Chechnya. On the one hand the intensification of brigandry and banditry; for example, an officer of the NKVD informed that in August 1943 54 armed bands were active in Chechnya-Ingushetia. They numbered 359 members, whereas 2045 deserters were searched for on the territory of the Republic . On the other, several reports and testimonies, that can be quite partial, from NKVD's archives mention a clandestine organization, run by the Chechen, that was named the OPKB, Special Party of the Caucasian Brothers. According to the same source, January 28, 1942, a constituent meeting of the OPKB was organized in Orjonikidze (today Vladikavkaz), in the Northern Ossetia. Participants elected members of the OPKB executif committee and of the OPKB "buro of organization". A document issued by the OPKB said that "all the anti-Soviet groupings and organizations, including a Chechen-Ingush anti-Soviet rebel organization of eleven Caucasian peoples of sister Republics (Azerbaijan, Adjaria, Abkhazia, Adygueya, Georgia, Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, the Northern Ossetia, the Southern Ossetia, Cherkessia, Chechnya-Ingushetia, Nakhichevan), according to the will of representatives... of these peoples, are united in the Special Party of the Caucasian Brothers, newly organized" . The same document exposed aims of the organization: "to unite all the anti-Soviet groupings and organizations", "to disorganize rears of the Soviet Army", "to accelerate the disappearance of bolshevism in the Caucasus and to encourage the defeat of Russia in the war against Germany", "to create in the Caucasus a free federal Republic - state of sister peoples of the Caucasus under the mandate of the German empire". The OPKB advanced the slogan of activity "the Caucasus - for Caucasians", proposing to "kill bolshevik spirit" and to "deport forever Russians and Jews" from the Caucasus. Among its actions, the OPKB foresaw "some systematic operations against remainders of bolshevism in order to assure German victory". At the same time, the Wehrmacht announced in a tract : "We advance and carry to you liberty and better life, worthy of you, Caucasians in love with the liberty!.. Long live the free Caucasus!" Already, a project of a coat of arms has been proposed: an eagle, holding in its claws a poisonous snake (symbol of bolshevism) and a pig (symbolizing the "defeated Russian barbarian" ). Another testimony indicated that in the second half of 1943, the rebels considered organizing a congress of the OPKB in Orjonikidze (Vladikavkaz). Georgians, Ossetes, Azeris, Ingushes, Chechen, as well as representatives of Germany, Turkey and Iran were to participate in this congress .

The NKVD also had got information about a general rebellion by Chechen that was planned for January 10, 1942, whereas the same source let know that the OPKB had in its ranks 24970 persons that were ready to fight. According to the NKVD, four diversive groups, conducted by an emigrant of Avar origin, Colonel Osman Gube, were recruited by the Abwehr and parachuted in Chechnya in order to organize a Chechen rebellion at the time of the German troop's arrival . Colonel Gube was captured in early 1943. According to his testimony, he succeeded in finding support among the Chechen . However, proofs do not exist of a direct collaboration between Chechen nationalists and simple brigands, on the one hand, and the command of the Wehrmacht, on the other. With regard to the existence of this organization, other sources indicate the existence in the late 1930s early 1940s, of a very active anticommunist resistance, conducted by Mayrbek Sheripov and Hasan Isra´lov, that sent emissaries to Germany in 1941 immediately after the beginning of the war between Germany and the USSR. The emissaries proposed support to the German troops in exchange for the creation of an independent Chechen state. This proposition was rejected by Berlin that could not accept the presence of any independent state on the Road to India.

November 9, 1941, the buro of the regional committee of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR discussed taking measures to put down a Chechen revolt in certain villages of Shatoy's, Itum-Kale and Galanchozh districts (Southern and South-Eastern mountains of Chechnya). It is interesting to note that this precise zone of the Chechen mountain was not repopulated after the return of the Chechen from their exile in 1957, whereas practically all the villages of the Galanchoj District, including Galanchoj, don't exist today. This information is confirmed by sources of the NKVD-KGB's archives. Thus, the commander of the 178th battalion of the interior troops of the NKVD, reported that "Nazi Germany secret agents had organized a rebellion in the territory of several districts of Chechnya-Ingushetia, during which most kolkhozs and rural soviets had been wrecked. He indicated from October 30 to November 5, 1941, his battalion, helped by units of the Red Army, had put down the revolt, killing "59 bandits" . August 17, 1942, an information buletin indicated that Mayrbek Sheripov launched an attack against the village of Chato´, center of the district of the same name . Sources of NKVD informed that in summer 1942, rebels took action in Itum-Kale and Sharoy Districts, situated in mountains of the Southern Chechnya. The same sources confirmed that rebels had succeeded in seizing villages of Khimoy, Itum-Kale and Shatoy. August 20, 1942, the 3rd battalion of the 141st regiment of the NKVD dislodged insurgents from Shato´. In that moment, Wehrmacht troops approached Chechnya, but they couldn't enter its territory and were stopped near Mozdok (actually Northern Ossetia). The Chechen rebels stopped fighting only in the Summer/Fall 1943, after Stalingrad's defeat of Germans and the Wehrmacht's definitive withdrawal from the Northern Caucasus .

In 1996, the official Russian sources affirmed that in 1942, under the aegis of Germany and Turkey, a commitee of the Chechen-Mountaineer National-Socialist Party was formed. It was not said where its headquarters were situated . Other sources affirmed that there were some units of North-Caucasian mountaineers in the Wehrmacht.

In no way can the documents from the KGB-NKVD archives, describing the situation in Chechnya in 1941-1944, justify the absurdity of the decision, taken by Stalin, to deport the "punished peoples" in 1943-1934. Even though the OPKB really existed, this party could not have had so many members. This Chechen resistance that, unlike the brigands, advanced some ideological objectives, in hanging and executing Russian physicians, school masters and civil servants, numbered several tens of armed fighters at the most.

Clan's rivalry.

Until today, the belonging to a clan is very important in Chechen society, whose daily life is still managed by the adats, customary law. The adats are spread in the Northern Caucasus since the Middle Ages. It seems that during more than two centuries, the Chechen social development was restrained at first by the War of the Caucasus, then by its isolation in the "mountain districts", later by a forced sovietization and currently by clashes, economic chaos and guerrilla warfare. With some exceptions, the way of life of Chechen didn't change during centuries, and even 70 years of Soviet rule didn't blot out old clan quarrels, that were materialized inside the Autonomous Republic in the form of the control of the power, highlighting the old opposition between mountain and plain clans.

The Chechen clan "teype" or "tayp" was composed of several big families, that, without exception, declared their common origin to be the same mythical ancestor. More than 135 teypes existed in the 19th century in Chechnya, before the beginning of the War of the Caucasus, after which a group of teypes has been deported in Ottoman empire. This is the list of "autochthonous" Chechen teypes : Aytkhaloy, Achaloy, Barchakhoy, Belkhoy, Belguiatoy, Benoy, Betsakhoy, Biltoy, Bigakhoy, Bouguiaroy, Varandoy, Vashandaroy, Va'ppiy, Galoy, Guiandoloy, Guiarchoy, Guiattoy, Guandarguenoy, Guiloy, Guioy, Guiordaloy, Dattakhoy, Diay, Dishniy, Do'rakhoy, Zh'evoy, Zandak'oy, Ziogoy, Zumsoy (Buguiaroy), Zurzak'khoy, Zurkhoy, Ishkhoy, Ikhiiroy, Italchkhoy, Kamalkhoy, Key, Keloy, Kuloy, Kurchaloy, Kushbukhoy (Yaliroy), Kkhartoy, Kiegankhoy, Lashkaroy, Makazhoy, Marshaloy, Merzhoy, Merloy, Mazarkhoy, Miaystoy, Mujakhoy, Mulk'oy, Nashkhoy, Nizhaloy, Nikiaroy, Nikhaloy, Nokkhoy, Peshkhoy, Pkhiamtoy, Pkhiarchoy, Rigakhoy, Sadoy, Sakhiandoy, Siarbaloy, Sa'ttoy, Sesankhoy, Sirkkhoy, O'shni´, Tumsoy, Tertakhoy, Tulkkhoy, Turkoy, Kharachoy, Khersanoy, Khildekhiarkhoy, Khoy, Khulandoy, Khurkhoy, Khiakkoy (Tsiogankhoy), Khiakmadoy, Khiacharoy, Khimoy, Khikhoy, Khiurkoy, Tsatsankhoy, Tsientaroy, Tsiechoy, Chartoy, Charkhoy, Chermoy, Chiarkhoy, Chiinkhoy, Chungaroy, Sharoy, Shik'aroy, Shirdoy, Shuonoy, Shpirdoy, Shu'ndi´, Eguiashbatoy, Elstanzhkhoy, Enakkhaloy, Enganoy, Ersanoy, Erkhoy, Yalkharoy, Yalkhoy, Yaliroy, Yamakhoy . It is necessary to add to this list about twenty "non-autochthonous" teypes formed by representatives of other peoples; for example, Gunoy, related to the Terek Cossacks, Dzumsoy, created by Georgians. Some teypes (Biltoy, Varandoy, Akhshpatoy and Gounoy) left Chechnya during its islamization. They opposed the sharia and settled in the Russian or Cossack villages at Terek. From that time, ties of friendship exist between certain teypes and Terek Cossacks, for example .

Movements of populations have changed clan maps. However, 17 teypes possess today eponymous villages: Belgatoy, Benoy, Vashnidaroy, Dattakhoy, Zandak'oy, Ishkhoy, Kurshaloy, Makazhoy, Nikhaloy, Kharachoy, Tsentoroy, Sharoy, Elstanzhkhoy, Enganoy, Ersanoy, Yalkhoy, Yaliroy. Some big teypes even possess several eponymous villages, that are often distant from one another. For example, members of Benoy live in the villages Benoy and Benoy-Vedeno in mountains of the South-East, but also in Benoy-Yurt in the Nadterechny District. Another big teype, Tsentoroy, has got two eponymous villages, as well the Belgatoy teype . However, before the deportation, 25 teypes had got their eponymous villages .

In the mid-19th century, 75% of Chechen teypes were united in 9 military-economic unions, tukkhums: A'kkhiy, Malkhiy, Nokhchmakhkoy, Terloy, Chianti, Chebarloy, Sharoy, Shuotoy, and Ershtkhoy. Every tukkhum occupied a definite territory, teypes of every tukkhum spoke the same dialect.

The A'kkhi´ tukkhum (now Chechen-Akkintsy in Daghestan) included the teypes Barchakhoy , Zh'evoy, Ziogoy, Pkhiarchoy, Pkhiarchakhoy and Va'ppiy, that occupied the territory in the East of Chechnya, bordering on Daghestan. The Malkhiy tukkhum united the teypes Bia'stiy, Bienastkhoy, Italchkhoy, Kamalkhoy, Kkhoratkhoy, Kiegankhoy, Meshiy, Sakankhoy, Teratkhoy, Chiarkhoy, Erkhoy and Yamkhoy, that occupied the South-West of Chechnya, bordering on Ingushetia and on Georgia. Members of the Nokhchmakhkoy tukkhum were Belguiatoy, Benoy, Biltoy, Guandarguenoy, Guiordaloy, Gunoy, Zandak'oy, Ikhiiroy, Ishkhoy, Kourshaloy, Sesankhoy, Chermoy, Tsientaroy, Chartoy, Eguiashbatoy, Enakkhaloy, Enganoy, Chuonoy, Yalkhoy, Yaliroy. Its zone was situated in the East, in the South-East and in part in the center of Chechnya. This tukkhum was the most strong, its territory was known as "Ichkeria". In the Chiebarloy (Chaberloy) tukkhum , there were the teypes Dia´, Makazhoy, Sadoy, Sandakhoy, Sikkhoy and Sirkhoy. It was situated in the South-Eastern Chechnya, in the Northern part of the Sharo-Argun valley. The Sharoy (Sharo) tukkhum (teypes Kinkhoy, Rigakhoy, Khikhoy, Khoy, Kh'akmadoy and Shik'aroy) occupied the upstream of Sharo-Argun. The Shuotoy (Shato) tukkhum (teypes Varandoy, Vashandaroy, Guiattoy, Keloy, Marshoy, Nizhaloy, Nikhaloy, Pkh'amtoy, Sa'toy and Kh'akkoy) occupied the territory of the central Chechnya, in downstream of the Chanty-Argun river. The Ershtkhoy tukkhum, that occupied the valley of the Low Martan (Fortanga), included the teypes Galoy, Guiandaloy, Guiarchoy, Merzhoy, Mouzhakhoy and Tsiechoy. The Chiantiy (Chanty) tukkhum (teypes Borzoy, Buguiaroy, Khildekh'aroy, Do'rakhoy, Khuokkhadoy, Kh'acharoy Tumsoy) occupied the territory in upstream of the Chanty-Argun river. The Tierloy (Tarelo) toukkhum (teypes Nik'aroy, O'shniy, Sho'ndi´, Eltpkh'arkhoy) occupied the upstream of the Chanty-Argun river too. The teypes Zurzak'khoy, Miastoy, Peshkhoy and Sadoy weren't in any tukkhum .

The clan map has been changing since the mid-19th century till today. One tukkhum (Ershtkhoy) was mainly deported at the end of the War of the Caucasus, the members of Ershtkhoy that remained were assimilated by Chechen and the Ingushes. Another tukkhum (A'kkhi´) gave birth to a particular Chechen group, that would be situated outside of the Chechen political space in close contact with the Kumyks. Five other tukkhums (Tierloy, Chianti´, Shouotoy, Chiebarloy, Sharoy), situated in valleys of the high mountain of the Sharo-Argun and Chanty-Argun rivers, lost their historic territory, since the return from the exile in 1957, at the end of the two years, in 1959, the basin of the Chanty-Argun and Sharo-Argun rivers has been practically emptied of their population (some villages disappeared completely, others, Charoy, Chatoys, Borzoy, lost a very big part of their population). Members of these five tukkhums have been settled in the big villages of the piedmont and of the plain, mixed with other Chechen and Russians. The Malkhi´ tukkhum, that also occupied the high mountain, was transfered to the plain too. The result of this is that the only Nokhmatchkhkoy, that occupied the mountainous region Ichkeria.preserved its historic lands, situated around the Shamil's Imamate's capital Vedeno. This tukkhum is the most ancient . It united probably the founder teypes of Chechnya and gave its name to the Chechen, that are called between them Nokhcho. In 1990, the National Congress of Chechen People proclaimed the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-Cho. Although Jokhar Doudayev didn't keep this name, in 1992, under his pressure, Chechnya received a new official name: Chechen Republic - Ichkeria (historic cradle of the Chechen, corresponded to the Nokhchmakhkoy's territory). Thus, Dudayev proclaimed the predominance of the intensely anti-Russian mountain teypes in the new independent Chechen Republic, unlike the Chechen Autonomous Republic, that was dominated by the hystorically pro-Russian plain teypes. This is not a coincedence if Ichkeria, that had made anti-Russian block with the Avars in the 19th century in the Shamil's Imamate, became since 1995, a home of a permanent Chechen resistance, and rear bases of Shamil Bassayev and Khattab.

It's not possible to understand the role plyed by teypes played in the 1990s, without understanding adats that are rules, according to which their members act. This mountaineer customary law was in force until 1917 in all mountain societies. The adats included the 23 articles regulating the teype's life in all spheres of life: inside the family, among members and in relations with members of another teype. The vendetta is explained very well in the adats, according to which the councel of elders of the teype met every time after the death of a member, to take the decision to avenge the victim. Generally, only close relatives and members of the family of the dead had the right to take part in the vendetta, whereas all the members of the teype discredited the murderer. Often, neutral teypes acted as intermediaries to settle amicably this kind of conflict. The compensation had to be payed in cows and depended on the importance of the teype, to which the dead belonged. For example, the murder of a member of an important teype could be compensated with 63 cows, whereas a wound, made by firearm, cost 20 cows to the malefactor, whereas the death of a member of a poor teype cost only 21 cows to the murderer, the compensation was of 6 cows for a firearm wound.

The adats forbade absolutely marriage between members of the same teype, even though an important teype can number as much as several thousand of people. According to many testimonies, this rule is observed until now in Chechnya. Women didn't have the right to participate in the life of the teype, they were deprived of the right to vote during the general meetings. However, in a certain way the adats protected women. For example, extraconjugal relations were punished severely by the community: If the offender had them with a girl or a widow, he owed in compensation 7 cows, whereas if he was in extraconjugal relations with a married woman, he had to pay 10 cows and was banished from the community. If the husband killed his wife and they hadn't had any children, he had to pay 85 cows to the wife's family, but if they had children, the husband paid only 12 cows. Norms of behaviour in daily life were set and enforced very well in detail. For example, from his younger age a Chechen knew how it was necessary to speak with his wife inside the family and in presence of other people, how to speak with children, how to behave at home and outside, what to do when he met an adult or a young man, how to help an elder to climb up and to alight from horseback, how to behave and what to speak about with a guest, for whom to give a place on the right hand during the meal, how to be seated at table and how to eat at home and elsewhere. All these rules were observed by all members of the teype and supervised by elders or adults. Traditions of hospitality were well present in Chechen daily life. For example, the murderer of a guest had to pay 7 cows to the master of the house where the killed guest had been received, and 63 cows to the killed guest's family.

The teypes had civilian chiefs (kh'alkhancha or tkh'amada ) and military chiefs (biacha). The civilian chief chaired the Counsel of the Elders of the teype and managed daily life, whereas the military chief entered in his functions only during the military operations.

Every teype had its name, received from its founder, occupied a territory, possessed an eponymous mountain, a tower, erected by the founder, its own divinity with a particular religious cult and a cemetery, reserved for members of the same teype .

There were two obligatory observations. The first is about the sacred character of the land for a Chechen teype as well as for every mountain community, suffering because of the shortage of arable land. That's why there was the will to "consecrate" the inhabiting zone and to delimit it, in marking its historic lands by the teype's symbols : cemetery, tower and eponymous mountain. The second observation is about of the importance of traditions in Chechen life. Although supplanted officially by soviet laws since the 1920s, the adats, continued to play a very important role in the internal relations of the Chechen society. Even at the Soviet time an important part of daily behaviour's norms was systematically observed by the Chechen: the woman's exclusion from the social life, the respect for the elders, the leading role of the teype's chief and the attachment to the historic lands. For example, even in the 1980s, a Chechen woman didn't have the right to travel alone and had to be accompanied by her husband or by his family's men; the vendetta continued to be in force, the murderer was pursued on the territory of all the Soviet Union; the marriage with the non-Chechen was rigorously punished. In the early 1990s, during numerous congresses and meetings, teype's structures have been recreated, teype's treasuries have been organized to finance the lobbying of interests in the structures of power. Hiding stocks of weapons, intact since the Second World War, were opened to arm the private militias, formed by every teype. With some modifications with regard to the 19th century, teypes restarted to play an active role in Chechen politics.

It is difficult to recreate today the geographical location of Chechen teypes, the clan map was considerably changed after a lot of forced displacements. What interests us, is the teype's belonging of politicians, that occupied sometimes a key position in the Chechen politics. General Dudayev, Chechen President in 1991-1996, the Chechen minister of oil products Sultan Albakov, and the Chechen state's security minister Sultan Gueliskhanov, belong to the Yalkhoroy teype. The former President of the Russian Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov is from the Kharachoy teype, based in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt. The mayor of the Nadterechny District Umar Avturkhanov, and former President of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet Doku Zavgayev belong to the Nijaloy teype, based currently in the Nadterechny District. The former chief of the Dudayev's government Yaragui Mamodayev and the mayor of Grozny, Beslan Gantemirov who became Dudayev's and Maskhadov's most important adversary, are from the Chonkhoy teype, that occupied the village of Urus-Martan .

Inside Chechen society, there exists an opposition, 200 years old, between mountain teypes (about 100 teypes) and plain teypes (about 70 teypes). The Dudayev-Maskhadov regime especially leaned on mountain teypes, that were the poorest layer of Chechen society, whereas the anti-Dudayev opposition was based on plain teypes. It seems also that the large teypes didn't support Jokhar Dudayev, except for the Benoy teype.

Sufi fraternities.

It's not possible to understand the complexity of the Chechen conflict, without speaking about sufi fraternities, that regroup most of the clans. The religious fraternities in the Northern Caucasus were well studied by Alexander Bennigsen , and his daughter Marie Bennigsen Broxup continued to study Moslem fraternities in the present context. Sufism is not a religious sectarian phenomenon, as the Russian and Soviet scientists believed, but a more intensive form of statement of the islamic faith by Sufi adepts. Sufi fraternities are subdivided into wirds, generally founded by religious leaders. These wirds carry often the names of their founders.

Two Moslem Sufi fraternities are spread currently throughout Chechnya: Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya. Adepts of the Naqshbandiya profess a more discreet form of prayer, while the Qadiris' form of faith is expressed in sorts of odd dances (zikr), accompanied by prayers too. Adepts are subordinated to their spiritual chiefs. In short, a sufi fraternity is a religious organization, uniting adepts of a particular form of Islam. This organization is strongly graded.

Historically, the Naqshbandiya's presence is prior to the introduction of the Qadiriya. The first naqshband spiritual chief was Sheikh Mansour, at the late 18th century, whereas the Qadiris appeared in the Northern Caucasus only in the 19th century, after the Caucasian War.

The implantation of the Naqshbandiya in the Northern Caucasus in general and in Chechnya in particularly is related to the personality of the imam Shamil, that transformed sufism into ideology of the imamate. If She´kh Mansur succeeded in turning Chechen into Russian and Cossack infidels, Shamil used sufism to give back to Islam its aggressivity, compatible with the origins of the Islamic expansionism. Not only Shamil proclaimed a holy war against infidels, but he also succeeded in imposing by force Islamic norms onto Moslem mountain populations. Shamil was severe, in imposing the sharia. He didn't hesitate to burn entirely the Chechen villages that refused to submit to sharia and to rally to the imamate .

The radicalization of North-Caucasian Islam can be explained by the penetration of the Naqshband sufi doctrine. It was introduced by pilgrims from Baghdad at first into Daghestan, and then into Chechnya. Actually, the introduction of Naqshbandiya into Daghestan was made by five persons: Magomet of Yarag, Khas-Magomet from Bukhara, Jemal-Addin, the first imam Kazi-Mulla, and the third imam Shamil. Thanks to the complicity of several local notables and chiefs the Naqshband doctrine had spread very quickly, essentially among the Avars, Lezguins and Chechen. Many Russian observers in the 19th century explained the resort to Sufism by mountain leaders during the War of the Caucasus, by the need to fanaticise the masses in the war against Russia and to unite small mountain ethnic groups under the flag of Islam, because, aside from a common religion, no other basis for uniting had not been found. It is necessary to specify that Magomet of Yarag embraced the Naqshband doctrine in the early of the 1820s, whereas the joining of many adepts and the rapid expansion of the Naqshbandiya, date from the Imamate of Shamil, in 1834-1859.

Geographically, the Qadiriya is especially present in Chechnya, where it has its stronghold, as well as in Ingushetia and in Daghestan. The establishing of the Qadiriya is owed to the activity of a Koumyk shepherd in the 1860-1870s, known under the name of Kunta Haji. It seems that the wird Kunta Hadji is the most powerful in the region. The Qadiriya was founded by a hanbalite doctor Abd-ul Qadir Gilani (1077-1166), whose grave in Baghdad is supposed to be venerated by all the Qadir adepts. Actually, almost the totality of Chechen and Ingush adepts of the Qadiriya don't know the term "sufism", nor "Qadiriya", and refer exclusively to the name of the founder of their wird ( for example, they say "adepts of Kunta Haji"). The expansion of the Kunta Haji's doctrine especially in Chechnya can be explained by the failure of Naqshbandiya and by the changing sides of the Naqshband chief, the imam Shamil who became pro-Russian at the end of his life. Shamil called on the Chechen to stop resistance and to submit to the czar. It seems that on the local level, the Qadiriya supplanted some branches of the Naqshbandiya, which can be explained more by the disappointment of the defeat in the war than by proselytism, excluded in North-Caucasian sufism. All the sufi members of the Qadiriya as well of the Naqshbandiya, are adepts by birth of a local fraternity, controlled by a she´kh, a Moslem dignitary of the village and at the same time a mullah of the local mosque. Five Qadir wirds are present in Chechnya: the Kunta Haji wird, whose motjer's tomb is situated near Grozny, spread throughout Ichkeria; the Bammat Guiry wird, stronghold of which is in the Chechen village of Avtury, situated thirty kilometers to the South-East of Grozny, adepts of which are members of the Gunoy teype; the Batal Haji wird, considered be extremely radical, being in the past at the origin of the anti-Soviet resistance, its stronghold is in Ingushetia; the Chim Mirza wird, stronghold of which is in Mayrtup, close to Shali in Chechnya ; and finally the youngest and the most radical Vis-Haji Zaguiev wird, founded in Kazakhstan. During exile, the eldest brother of General Dudayev, Bekmouraz Dudayev, rejoined this last wird, that would become later the most powerful Qadir wird in Chechnya after 1957. It is necessary to add that it was the Qadirs who suceeded in converting the Ingushes to Islam, and that's why their position is especially strong in Ingushetia.

In return, most Naqshbands are in Daghestan, and a strong and influential Naqshband fraternity has settled since a long time in Chechnya. In Chechnya, the Naqshbands are implanted in Tolstoy-Yurt, in Urus-Martan and in the Nadterechny District. This zone corresponds to the anti-Dudayev opposition strongholds in 1992-1995.

On the social plan, Naqshband adepts are often intellectuals, so-called "arabists" because they knew Arabic, and that they belong mostly to the elite clans of the Chechen society, while the Qadiris are especially rurals. The silent prayer of the Naqshbands implies a submmission that asks for a more long and strong spiritual effort than the Qadirs' dances and songs. Typical of the Chechen aristocracy, the Chechen family of Arsanov, that was very implicated in the struggle for the power in Chechnya in fall 1991, belongs to the Naqshbands.

These two fraternities are opposed in Chechnya, this opposition is matched by the clans' rivalry. Historically, the two fraternities' adepts have been oriented differently. For example, Naqshbandiya was the spiritual basis of the Shamil's imamate. Later the Qadiriya was opposed against armed struggle against the Russians. In the soviet time, fraternities also took opposite positions. The Naqshbands massively took part in a revolt against bolsheviks in 1920-1921, while the Qadirs collaborated actively with Communists. The first Chechen leaders, that rejoined the soviet administration, were Qadirs . But since 1928, the Qadirs have been repressed as well the Naqshbands. Following the anti-religious campaign, the fraternities became underground organizations and activity had to be held secret by their members.

Currently, it is difficult to distinguish real opposition between the two religious fraternities. But, all the clans, that had supported Dudayev were Qadir, whereas his most influential opponents were Naqshbands. For example, in 1991, Yeltsin appointed his personal representative in Chechnya, Akhmed Arsanov, supported by members of the Sheikh Deni Arsanov fraternity. They created a coalition with members of the Temporary Council (what remained of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, dissolved by Dudayev) and of the Intelligentsia's Association . In reply to this appointment, the Chechnya's Council of the Elders, formed mostly by members of Qadir Vis-Haji Zaguiev wird, stated that the Naqshbands were a KGB stronghold. But these present attitudes are historically contradictory. Normally, Shamil was a Naqshband spiritual leader and, according to Bennigsen, the sheikh Deni Arsanov led during years incursions against Cossack colonies on Terek and was killed finally by the Terek Cossacks . However, after having been supporters of the pacific way in the 19th century, the Qadirs collaborated with bolsheviks in the 1920s. At present, the Qadirs constituted the close circle of the separatist Dudayev and the most of the present Chechen resistants are Qadirs. For example, the counselor of Dudayev on religious questions (until Dudayev's death in 1996) was a certain Magomed-Haji Dolkayev, Qadir dignitary, although he was direct descendant of the Naqshband Sheikh Mansur.

This ideological reversal can be explained by the social profile of adepts of two sufi fraternities. The Naqshbands, more influential and more intellectual, formed the Chechen elite and the intellectual and commercial diaspora of Moscow. More powerful, they succeeded in establishing a privileged dialogue with Moscow. The Qadirs, of more "simple" origins, have served of basis to the Chechen revolution. For a long time deprived of the power, the Qadirs succeeded in taking Grozny in fall 1991 and resisted with relentlessness to the Russians' and pro-Russian Chechen' thrust. However, the rivalry of the two fraternities comes within the scope of a inter-clan struggle. Confraternities serve more often as ideological covers for certain clans, and permit to accelerate mobilization of adepts.

The secession.

Premises of the secession.
The Chechen secessionist tendencies don't date from the perestroyka, because these tendencies never have completely desappeared. Some specialists in Caucasian affairs affirm that the Chechen revolt has never been put down by Moscow. The chronicles of the political events mention only the violent episodes: Sheikh Mansur's resistance, the Caucasian War against Shamil, the revolt of 1877-1878, the ethnic clashes during the civil war, the guerrilla warfare in 1941-1943, the riots of Grozny of 1971 and the secession after 1991. The resistance against Russians continued during all the Russian domination of the Caucasus. The Chechen always lived in their universe, professing a particular ideology, founded on clans and religious fraternities. Chechnya remained different from the other republics of the Northern Caucasus. Relations were never good between the Russian newcomers and the Chechen. After the return of the Chechen from exile the post of the first secretary of the Chechen regional committee of the PCSU was always occupied by a Russian. Only during the perestroyka, a first Chechen was appointed to this post. However, Russians and Chechen generally succeeded in avoiding the open confrontations. After 1959, Russians began to leave all the Autonomous Regions of the Northern Caucasus. They moved in the "Russian" regions, situated more to the North. Thus, if Russians constituted, in 1970, 37,2% of the total population of the Kabardino-Balkaria, in 1979 their part was only 35,1%, and in 1989 - 32,0%. This was almost a general tendency, but the Russian emigration from Chechnya was one of the most intensive.

Three factors influenced strongly the formation and the radicalisation of the Chechen ethno-political movement, and then the launching of hostilities, that helped the arrival of General Jokhar Dudayev to the power.

At first, there were ecological problems in Chechnya. They were provoked by an excessive exploration of the Republic natural's resources, especially of the oil deposits. This exploration deteriorated the Chechen landscape, whereas nature always was an important part of the Chechen identity. Pollution problems were especially serious in the industrial suburbs of Grozny (situated in a hollow, that encouraged the accumulation of the aerial pollution), dominated by the transformation of oil, and in Gudermes, where, in the late 1980s, a project of the biochemist component's production mobilized the intelligentsia of all the Republic.

Then, leaders of the Chechen nationalistic movement have also been inspired by Georgia's example, that succeeded in freeing itself from domination of Moscow in 1989. In April 1989, a hunger-strike and a series of manifesations took place in Tbilissi. April 9, 1989, the crowd, united on the central square of the Georgian capital was broken up by soldiers of the Soviet army. 21 people were killed, which provoked a wave of nationalism. November 17-18, 1989, a session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet disapproved of the violation by Soviet Russia, of the treaty with Georgia of May 7, 1920, that let annexe Georgia to Russia in February 1921. In October 1990, the political block "Round table" of Zviad Gamsakhurdia gained victory in the general elections, and, in December of the same year, the Georgians blocked the Southern Ossetia. The proclamation of a Republic, bordering on Chechnya and independent from Moscow, promised a possible support in the struggle against the common adversary, which would be produced in 1991, when Jokhar Dudayev and Zviad Gamsakhourdias established narrow relations.

The third factor that encouraged the Chechen political movement was the Gulf war and solidarity with Irak. In the late 1990s, Moslems of the Northern Caucasus, especially of Daghestan and of Chechnya-Ingushetia, organized a series of demonstrations in Makhachkala and in Grozny, supporting Saddam Hussein. For example, in Chechnya-Ingushetia, a Committee of the Movement for the Defense of Irak was created in December 1990. It organized important demonstrations of protest, rallies, collection of medicine and money, as well the enrolment of volunteers wishing to fight in Irak. Some local sources pretend that an "army corps" of 25 000 volunteers was formed to fight by the sides of the Iraqis. The President of the committee, Abdul Aliev, at the same time one of the leaders of the Vaynakh Democratic Party, Chechen nationalistic conservative political movement, organized a demonstration in Grozny, in early February 1991, with slogans: "Stop the war against Iraq!" and "Iraq, the people of Chechnya-Ingushetia is with you!" At the same moment, tracts were distributed in the Territory of Stavropol, in which the Terek Cossacks were asked to leave Chechnya-Ingushetia, Daghestan and all the Northern Caucasus before three months. The tract spoke about President Saddam Hussein: "Our young tiger, Iraqi Hussein, the tract said, stood up and revived his muscles. He will launch an appeal and we, Moslem believers, will follow him. We constitute an absolute majority on earth, and there exists no force that will be able to stop us" .

The Chechen revolution of 1991.

In the late 1980s, the Greens enter Chechen political life. They organize a series of actions aiming to prevent the construction of a new bio-chemical factory in Gudermes. In the same time, a lot of teypes' meetings are held everywhere in Chechnya. During these meetings, every teype elected a clan's chief. The "black treasuries" were created to finance clan's activities and to form militias. Then, hidden stocks of weapons, buried during the Second World War, have been opened, and a lot of weapons begin to circulate in Chechnya. Several Chechen political movements met in order to found a National Congress of Chechen People , (NCChP), the first session of which has been organized in November 1990. A Major-General of the Soviet Air Force that was in command of a bombers' regiment in Estonia, Jokhar Dudayev, is elected President of the Congress' executive committee. Dudayev resigns in the early 1991, and moves to Chechnya, where he transforms the Congress into a powerful political organization, financed by Yaragui Mamodayev, director of the Chechen building trade. Several political tendencies are present in the executive committee of the Congress: the Greens, the Islamists, the democrats, the traditionnalists and the radicals. During the second session of the NCChP, in the early June 1991, radicals take the upper hand over other tendencies, whereas the democrats and traditionnalists leave the Congress, in accusing Dudayev of wanting to provoke a civil war. The NCChP proclaims the creation of a Chechen Republic Nokhtchi-Tcho. This self-proclaimed Republic was not part either of the USSR, nor of the Russian Federation.

In Chechen political life two politicians oppose: local chief of the PCUS and speaker of Republican parliament Doku Zavgayev, and a Muscovite Chechen Ruslan Khasbultov, that was one of the close supporters of Boris Yeltsin and vice-speaker of the Russian parliament. After the election in June 1991 of Boris Yeltsin to the presidency of the Russian Federation, Khasbultov becomes speaker of the Russian parliament. Naturally, he tries to replace Zavgayev by his man, however Doku Zavgayev resists. Zavgayev placed in all the Republic's key-posts men of his teype, and usurped the power in Chechnya-Ingushetia.

While the Chechen begin to claim their independence, the Ingushes, that dispute with the Ossetes about the Prigorodny District, don't wish to leave the Russian Federation. The separation of Chechnya-Ingushetia becomes unavoidable.

August 19-21, 1991, an putsch attempt has been undertaken in Moscow, aiming to dismiss the Soviet President Mikha´l Gorbachev. A crowd, conducted by militants of the NCChP, invades the central place of Grozny. The Republic's leader, Doku Zavgayev, temporized before condemning putschists, until their failure becomes obvious. August 22, leaders of the NCChP ask for the resignation of the Chechen-Ingush parliament and of his speaker Doku Zavgayev because of their supposed support of the putschists. Militants of the Congress seized the republican television, by which General Dudayev spoke to inhabitants of the Republic and explained demands of the opposition. August 25, an extraordinary session of Chechen-Ingush parliament took place in Grozny. After having listened to General Dudayev, deputies rejected the claims of the NCChP and asked to stop riots . August 26, a delegation of the Russian parliament comes to Grozny. Its members warn Zavgayev that the political crisis in Chechnya cannot be settled by force . In the following days, the praesidium of the Chechen-Ingush parliament resigns, whereas Zavgayev and his deputies remain in their posts. An attempt of talks between the republican parliament and the opposition failures. Deputies reject again the NCChP's demands and describe the actions of the Chechen radicals as anti-constitutional. August 31, the interim speaker of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov arrives in Grozny, whereas the unrest flares up the city: rallies, strikes, barricades on fire, overturned buses . September 1-2, the third session of the NCChP states that the republic's parliament is dismissed, its executive commitee assumes all the power on all the territory of Chechnya-Ingushetia. September 3, Chechen-Ingush parliament introduces the state of emergency in the Republic, but police and military, whose units are situated in Chechnya-Ingushetia, proclaim their neutrality in the conflict. The NCChP's militants control Grozny and most of districts of the Republic. Barricades are raised in Grozny's streets . September 4-5, the republic's parliament and the NCChP oppose, in trying to attract on their side the rural populations . September 6, Doku Zavgayev holds a meeting with deputies, mayors and directors of factories of the Republic in the building of the political center. Zavgayev states that he will remain in his functions. The National Guards of the NCChP seize the building and interrupt the meeting, whereas the police, who have to protect it, don't interfere. Several persons have been wounded or molested during the assault, whereas the chief of the PCUS of Grozny, Vitali Kutsenko, is defenestrated. The National Guards forced Zavgayev to sign his resignation. The NCChP's executive committee announces in newspapers that the Chechen-Ingush parliament and its speaker have resigned. A temporary committee, conducted by Yaragui Mamodayev, is created to replace the executive power. The NCChP controls the administrative buildings, the Republic's television and radio station, whereas the mobilization on the central square in Grozny continues since three weeks . September 6, some factories of the Republic begin the presidential electoral drive, in proposing the candidacy of Salambek Khadjiev, deputy of the Soviet parliament and former Minister of oil of the USSR. September 7, several parties of the opposition having supported Jokhar Dudayev, condemn the forced dissolution of the Republic's parliament and accuse the President of the NCChP's executive committee of having usurped the power. September 10, General Dudayev states that the aim of the NCChP is the creation of an independent and democratic state . September 11, refugee in a mountain village, Doku Zavgayev speaks by the radio to inhabitants of the Republic. He affirms that he controls the situation in Chechnya-Ingushetia. The speaker of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbultov, sends a telegram to the NCChP's executive committee and expresses his satisfaction about the Zavgayev resignation . September 12, talks begin between a Russian government delegation and the NCChP's executive committee. These negotiations don't give any concrete result. The National Guards continue to enlist volonteers and already count several thousands of fighters. The executive committee forms the customs' service, employees of which get settled in the airport and on the borders of the Republic . The speaker of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbultov, arrives in Grozny. He asks for the resignation of all the deputies of Chechnya-Ingushetia, that in his mind are involved in thieving, corruption and speculation. By local television, Khasbultov states that it is not possible to bear any longer such a situation and affirms that the people demand to take "strong measures" . However, anti-Dudayev's opposition organizes a Democratic Reforms' Movement, DRM, that unites the Association of the Intelligentsia, the Civil Concord Movement and the Social-Democrat Club. Salambek Khadjiev is elected President of the MRD. The MRD announces that Chechnya is threatened by the institution of a dictatorship in the style of Zviad Gamsakhourdia. According to the MRD, this dictatorship can be imposed by shade economy's lobbies . September 15, in absence of Doku Zvagayev and of his first deputy A.Petrenko, the last session of the Chechnya-Ingushetia's parliament takes place in Grozny. The building, where the session takes place, is surrounded by the National Guards. Under the Ruslan Khasbultov's pressure, deputies vote for the resignation of the parliament's speaker, Doku Zavgayev, and the self-dissolution of the parliament. The general elections are fixed for November 17, 1991. A temporary organ of power is formed: the Temporary Supreme Council, TSC, composed of 32 deputies, mainly belonging to anti-Zavgayev opposition. At the same time, Ingush deputies meet in Nazran and proclaim an Ingush Republic, that is part of the Russian Federation. September 17, the republican movement of the Greens announces its disagreement with the policies of the NCChP; the leader of the Green, R. GoytÚmirov leaves the ministerial committee of the NCChP . September 18, the number of TSC members is reduced to 13. The vice-president of the the NCChP's executive committee, Khusseyn Akhmadov becomes its president, whereas the "man of confidence" of Ruslan Khasbultov, Yuri Cherny, is elected its deputy. The TSC announces that in addition to the general elections, it also prepares the presidential elections . September 25, the anti-Dudayev opposition, united in a block "Round Table", demands to the NCChP to not usurp the power, to free the television and the radio and to dissolve armed formations. Five members of the TSC, controlled by Yuri Cherny, disapprove of the usurpation of the power by the NCChP's executive committee. September 26, Ruslan Khasbultov sends a telegram, in which he warns that if the power is usurped by the "informal organizations" (NCChP), the results of elections won't be recognized. September 27, three Ingush members leave the TSC, because of the proclamation of the Ingush Republic. Nine members remain in the TSC: 4 men of Khousse´n Akhmadov (NCChP) and 5 deputies, controlled by Yuri Cherny (man of Khasbultov). October 1st, 4 members of the TSC, under the direction of Akhmadov, publish several legislative acts in the name of the TSC, including an act on the separation of Chechnya-Ingushetia in two republics. Yuri Cherny states that all the acts, issued by Akhmadov, don't have any legal force, because they have not been voted by the majority of the TSC's members . October 2, Khusseyn Akhmadov denies the declaration of Tcherny and affirms that all the acts, including the act on the presidential elections, have been adopted legally. At the same time, the block of anti-Dudayev opposition "Round Table" holds a meeting in Grozny, with the participation of trade unionist leaders and of the deputy of the TSC's president Yuri Cherny. Again, the opposition condemns the illegal taking of the power by the NCChP and asks to dissolve the National Guards, to stopp the blockade of the republican radio and of television station and to cancell the holding of the Chechen republican presidential elections presidential, foreseen for October 19. October 5, seven from nine members of the TSC meet in Grozny home with representatives of the republic parliament and trade unionist leaders. They decide to cancel the acts, adopted by Akhmadov, and to dismiss Akhmadov from the post of TSC president. 7 TSC members ask the Republic's interior minister to assure the protection of TSC and to disarm the NCChP's National Guards. The National Guards take the House of Trade Unions, 7 members of the TSC run off. The same day the National Guards seize the republican heardquarters of the KGB. During the assault, one agent of the KGB is killed . October 6, the the NCChP's executive committee dissolves the TSC because of subversive actions and provocations. General Dudayev states that members of the TSC entered a plot with the KGB, having for goal to undertake a coup d'Etat in the Republic. The TSC continues to work in clandestinity. A Russian government's delegation, conducted by Russian vice-president, Alexander Rutskoy, comes to Grozny. It meets all participants of the conflict: members of the executive committee of the NCChP, members of the TSC and representatives of anti-Dudayev's opposition. The Rutskoy visit has no result . October 7, the TSC restarts its activities in Grozny in its former composition of 37 members. It asks for the population to boycott the presidential elections, announced by the NCChP's executive committee, and announces its own presidential elections, foreseen for November 17. October 7-8, the NCChP's National Guards seize during the night the headquarters of the TSC in Grozny . Alexander Rutskoy makes a very negative report to the Russian parliament about the actions of the NCChP: havoc in the administrative buildings, abductions of republican officials, aggressive attitude of the National Guards. Deputies recognize the TSC as the only lawful organ of power in Chechnya-Ingushetia and invite the TSC to take "all necessary steps to stabilize the situation". The Russian parliament gives a time limit of 24 hours to the armed formations to give back their weapons . The executive committee considers the Russian parliament's decree as "a coarse and provocative interference in the affairs of the Chechen Republic" and as a "declaration of war". Rutskoy proposes to Dudayev and to the NCChP to participate in the elections under the aegis of the TSC, if they submit to the ultimatum. General Dudayev rejects the offer and states: "Our rights, we hold them from our people." The NCChP proclaims a general mobilization of all men from 15 to 55 years old, and proclaims illegal all the decrees issued by the TSC. The office of the public prosecutor of Chechnya-Ingushetia is seized by the National Guards, whereas the president of the Va´nakh Democratic Party Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, proclaims the jihad, holy war against infidels, and calls his supporters to arms. October 10, two rallies take place in Grozny. The first is anti-Russian and conducted by the NCChP, another is organized by the anti-Dudayev opposition. Several local militias are organized in the rural zones. October 13, the Russian television announces that the the NCChP's executive committee condemned to death in absentia Ruslan Khasbultov and Alexander Routskoy, the Chechen side denied the information. Another delegation from Moscow visits Grozny. The NCChP's leaders accept to cancel the general mobilization, if the Russian parliament in its turn cancels the ultimatum. The NCChP's executive committee confirms the holding of the republican presidential and general elections October 27. It announces that at present the question about the separation from the Russian Federation or the Soviet Union will not be solved during a referendum untill after the elections of October 27 . At the same time, representatives of the NCChP's executive committee, of the TSC and of the democratic forces' demonstration in Grozny form a "state committee of national concord". The TSC and the democratic forces (anti-Dudayev's opposition) insist on the delaying of the October 27's presidential elections and on the conservation of Chechnya-Ingushetia. October 19, Russian President Boris Yeltsin gives an ultimatum to the NCChP . General Dudayev announces that the pressure by force on behalf of Yeltsin can not be accept by a people "that fights for its liberty" . October 26, Jokhar Dudayev says in an interview to the AP agency that after he's elected President of Chechnya-Ingushetia, he will study the question "on the possibility to lead a war against Russia" . October 27, under the aegis of the NCChP, the presidential elections take place in Chechnya-Ingushetia. They are boycotted by the Ingush and Cosack districts of the Republic. The TSC warns that these elections have no legal value . The opposition states that only 30% of voters have participated in the voting of October 27. Elected President of Chechnya, Jokhar Dudayev announces that the Chechen presidential and general elections of October 27, were a logical crowning piece of the way of Chechnya toward the independence . October 29 TSC and anti-Dudayev's opposition begin to form popular militias in counterweight of the National Guards of Dudayev. The TSC begins an electoral drive for the general elections, fixed for November 17. At the same time, Ruslan Khasbultov is elected speaker of the Russian parliament, he has been interim speaker since June 1991, when Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Federation. November 3, Abkhazia, Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia states that he supports President Dudayev . November 8, Boris Yeltsin introduces the state of emergency in Chechnya-Ingushetia, and gives the order about the confiscation of side-arms and firearms, that the population possess. President Dudayev introduces the state of war and affirms to be invested of "powers of exception". He warns Moscow about the possibility of "terrorist acts, including bomb attacks against the nuclear power stations". Dudayev states to the AFP that Moscow is proclaimed a "disaster-stricken zone", in adding that "all the Caucasus is going to stand up [against the aggressor]". Planes transporting troops land in Khankala, military airfield of Grozny . On the next day, the National Guards of the NCChP block the Khankala's airfield, whereas about ten thousand demonstrators meet in the center of Grozny. They protest against the introduction of troops. Without using weapons, the Russian soldiers are transported, under the control of the National Guards, from Khankala to Vladikavkaz (Northern Ossetia). November 11, the Russian parliament cancels President Yeltsin's decree on the introduction of the state of emergency in Chechnya-Ingushetia.

The Chechen revolution's results are the arrival of General Dudayev and of the NCChP, dominated by radicals, to the power in Chechnya, the separation of Chechnya-Ingushetia, the creation of several armed formations (National Guards of the NCChP, militias of the anti-Dudayev's opposition), the failure of a democratic transition and weakening of the opposition to the Dudayev's regime following the Russian intervening. The success of Chechen radicals in general and of Jokhar Dudayev in particular can be explained by the superposition of several factors. These were President Yeltsin's weakness (he fought at the same time against the Soviet President Gorbachev and the Rutskoy-Khasbulatov's tandem), the neutrality of the Soviet Army (it didn't yet become the Russian army), the other Moslem minorities' radicalization (in Tatarstan, for example), and the intervening of Gorbachev (Soviet President personally opposed to the use of force in Grozny). In fall 1991 during the Chechen revolution, Gorbachev was still in power.

Chechen-Ingush crisis.

The separation of Ingushetia from Chechnya provoked a serious territorial conflict that in turn nearly resulted in armed confrontation between the Ingushes and the Chechen. The main reason of this crisis was the absence of a definite border between the Ingush districts and Chechnya.

The crisis begins January 5, 1992, when the Chechen President proposes his solution to the Ingush problem: creation of a Vaynakh Republic and promises to the Ingushes to enter into talks with Northern Ossetia about the Ingush lands of the Prigorodny District. These lands weren't restored by the Ossetes to Chechnya-Ingushetia in 1957 . On the next day, the Chechen parliament defines Chechen-Ingush borders, in including in Chechnya the Sunzhenski District, with a mixed Ingush-Chechen population . The Ingush ethno-political movements advocate against the uniting of the Sunjenski District with Chechnya . Several Ingush demonstrations take place. January 10, a civic disobedience campaign begins in Ingushetia. Dudayev institutes direct presidential administration in the Sunzhenski District. The Sunzhenski District's Chechen, that support the NCChP, forms a temporary committee for the district's administration . January 12, tension goes up in the Sunzhenski District, when the district's Ingush majority organizes a rally against the Chechen parliament's resolution about the Chechen-Ingush border. The Ingushes block roads in the Sunzhenski District and create National Guards. The Sunzhenski, Nazran's and Malgobek's districts proclaim the introduction of the state of emergency . January 13, talks begin in Grozny between Ingush representatives and Chechen deputies. However, at the end of the negotiations the Ingush delegation is arrested by the NCChP's National Guards. Thanks to the Dudayev's personal intervening, members of the delegation are freed. January 14, the Ingush section of the higway Grozny-Vladikavkaz is blocked by Ingushes. The Chechen deputies insist that the borders are already defined and that they won't go back anymore on this question. Chechen-Ingush clashes take place in Troytskaya. The Chechen council of elders demands revenge. Early February, elections take place in the Chechen part of the Sunzhenski District, a self-administration organ is created. It decides to include the Chechen zone of the Sunzhenski District to the Chechen Republic. February 13, President Dudayev puts his veto on the parliamentary resolution about Chechen-Ingush border. The situation in Ingushetia becomes again normal .

Some months after the attempt of Russian military intervening in Chechnya, Dudayev threatens an ethnic minority like Moscow threatened Chechnya, in using diktat and force. These methods will be used many times by the Chechen President in his confrontations with the opposition in 1992 - 1994. A pseudo-democratic Republic changes gradually in a Latino-American type's personal dictatorship.

The struggle for oil and confrontations with the opposition.
In 1992 - 1993, a struggle for oil opposed on one hand, the President Jokhar Dudayev, the oil's minister Sultan Albakov, and the state security's minister Sultan Gueliskhanov (Yalkhoroy teype), and on the other, the chief of the Chechen government Yaragui Mamodayev and the mayor of Grozny Beslan Gantemirov (Tchonkhoy teype). In the same time, Dudayevites opposed to members of the Nijaloy teype of the former speaker of the Chechen-Ingush parliament Zavgayev, based in the Nadterechny District and directed by its mayor Umar Avturkhanov. The conflict for the oil profits' sharing drove to uniting members of two teypes, opposed to Dudayev (Nijaloy and Yalkhoroy teypes). In summer 1994, they were rejoined by the former speaker of the Russian parliament and his Chonkhoy teype. During the summer-fall 1994, the sporadic clashes between Dudayev fighters and the Chechen opposition increase and change gradually in a civil war. The opposition call Moscow to intensify its military help. Implied in the conflict, in December 1994, the federal troops are introduced in Chechnya.

The war of 1994-1996.
The Russian army became quickly victim of its weight. This war machine was equipped with a large number of armored vehicles and organized in view of a possible battle in Germany. But it was not adapted to street fighting. The Russian forces met a well organized resistance in Grozny. Five assaults on the Chechen capital ended in failure. Thousands of young Russian recruits died during the first weeks of the fighting. However, since early 1995, the Russian army regained its control. Elite troops are sent into Chechnya. They made headway in the city and captured the Chechen presidential palace January 19, 1995 . Only from January 6, 1995 the parachutists of General Babitchev and the GRU's special forces began to intervene, in applying Stalingrad tactics . In order to limit to the minimum their losses, federal troops used excessively the heavy artillery, causing a lot of deaths among civilians.

The battle for Grozny ended February 8, 1995, after the evacuation of Dudayev's headquarters from the city . Dudayev's success in this battle can be explained by several factors. First, waiting for an intervening of Russian troops, General Dudayev, who was a professional military man, constituted a professional mini-army that numbers several thousands of fighters. This army was based on the National Guards and "Abkhazian" battalions . These units obtained an experience during the clashes with anti-Dudayev's opposition in 1993-1994. Secondly, Dudayev succeeded in constituting renewable stocks of weapons and munitions, thanks to the aerial bridge that he organized between Azerba´djan and Chechnya. The former soviet weapons arrived in Azerba´djan from Pakistan, that obtained a stock of weapons imported after the Afghan war, and from Turkey, that acquired soviet weapons in East Germany in the early 1990s. In 1994, the Chechen aerial company Stigl registered the airport of Khartoum, in Sudan, two planes TU-134. These planes multiplied their flights between Baku and Khartoum, during the month before the Russian intervening in Chechnya . They will serve for the transport of weapons in 1994-1995. Third, the Chechen President used mercenaries from the Baltic countries, from Ukraine, from Arab countries and from Afghanistan. In late September-early October 1994, Chechen emissaries visited the headquarters of Gulbudin Hekmatyar, who was leader of the Afghan Islamist movement Hezb I-islami. Hekmatyar assured them that a detachment of mudjahedin would be sent into Chechnya. The Cypriot newspaper Eleftimia informed that the most of Afghan fighters had to be transferred from the zone of the Nagorny Karabakh's conflict, where they were since 1993 . December 29, 1994, the Russian defense minister explained the professionalism of the Chechen fighters by the presence in their ranks of many mercenaries from Afghanistan and from Pakistan . January 5, 1995, Russian official sources indicated that about 300 Afghan mudjahedin fought on the sides of Chechen . January 13, 1995, journalists of Segodnia informed that the Chechen militias were routed near Grozny in the first days of the fighting, whereas inside the city, the Russian soldiers met trained professionals of various origins (Afghan, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and even Russian mercenaries) .

After having regrouped forces following the battle of Grozny, the federal troops switch over to the offensive and seize Argun (March 23, 1995) , Gudermes (March 30, 1995) , Shali (March 31, 1995) , Samashki (April 9, 1995) , Vedeno (June 4, 1995) , Shatoy and Nojay-Yurt (June 13, 1995) .

However, a spectacular hostage taking in the hospital of Boudionnovsk by the Chechen commando of Shamil Bassayev, June 14-20, 1995, stops the victorious march of Russian troops. Russian-Chechen talks begin in Grozny. They end with the signing of a peace agreement on July 30, 1995 between the rebels and the Russian command. The agreement foresees a cease-fire and an exchange of all the prisoners of war, as well as the withdrawal of a large part of troops in exchange for disarmament of the Chechen fighters. Two federal troop brigades have to remain in Chechnya .

Large-scale actions doesn't resume, but some sporadic clashes continue with a variable intensity. Talks continue without arriving at any agreement on the political questions. The Chechen secessionists insist on the separation of their Republic from Russia, this being unacceptable for Moscow. September 10, 1995, the Russian army begins to evacuate its units from Chechnya . The situation deteriorates on September 19, when the Russian delegation insists on the forced disarmament of the secessionists, if they don't disarm themselves . September 20, the crisis continues after the missed bomb attack, aiming for Boris Yeltsin's representative in Chechnya, Oleg Lobov . The crisis deepens when, October 6, an bomb attack severely wounds the federal troop commander in Chechnya, General Anatoli Romanov. He enteres in deep coma . October 9, whereupon Moscow interrupted the talks in Grozny .

November 1st, the former speaker of the Chechen-Ingush parliament, Doku Zavgayev, returns to Chechnya. He is appointed chief of the Chechen government (pro-Moscow) . November 20, a bomb attack failes to kill Zavgayev . In December 1995, Doku Zavgayev is elected President of the Chechen Republic. However, the elections are boycotted by the secessionists .

December 14, 1995, a chief of war, stepson of Dudayev Salman Raduyev with his fighters seizes Gudermes . Only December 24, the rebels have been dislodged from the city, 267 Chechen fighters were dead . January 9, 1996, Raduyev's commando infiltrates Kizliar (Northern Daghestan). With 250 hostages, rebels entrench themselves in Pervomayskoye, on Chechen-Daghestani border. January 18, the village is freed. The Russian sources report that 153 rebels are killed during the assault, whereas Raduyev with succeeds in taking flight with some men . January 17, the abduction of hostages of Pervomayskoye becomes a major international event, when a pro-Chechen commando seizes an Avrasya ferry with 95 Russian citizens in Turkey. Terrorists ask to release Raduyev's commando, surrounded by Russian special forces in Pervomayskoye .

The new stage in confrontations begins, March 6-9, 1996, when the rebels, controlled by Shamil Bassayev, seize for four days part of Grozny . Fights intensify everywhere in Chechnya, rebels take and lose villages, whereas bombings of the federal Air Force continue. The Russian troops launch a new offensive in mountains in the South-East of the Chechen Republic and take Sayasan and Tsentoroy (April 2, 1996), Belgotoy (April 5, 1996) . Rebels take the initiative, in destroying a federal armored column, (23 armored vehicles out of 27 are destroyed), 25 kms from Grozny (April 16, 1996) . The death of General Dudayev by a missile strike near Gekhi Tchu (April 21, 1996) doesn't change the tactics of the rebels: guerrilla warfare. After the disappearance of Dudayev, Moscow enters into negotiations with secessionists. The interim Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and the Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin sign an agreement on a cease-fire in Kremlin (May 27, 1996) , however clashes continue in Chechnya. Russians accuse Yandarbiev of not controlling his fighters, who act independently from their president. Tensions increase when the rebels take 26 Russian soldiers prisoner near Noja´-Yurt (June 1st, 1996) . Russian-Chechen talks in Makhatchkala are cancelled. An explosion dammages a Moscow subway's carriage (June 11, 1996) , whereas a Chechen delegation (secessionist) is aimed by a bomb attack in Chechnya (June 12, 1996) . Another bomb attack occurs in a bus in Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria) and six persons are killed . Russian-Chechen talks resume and fail again. Rebels resume fights in Urus-Martan, Noja´-Yurt and Kurchaloy (July 9, 1996) . Two other bomb attacks occur in Moscow (July 11-12, 1996) and injure 33 persons. Clashes with rebels continue in Shatoy, Stary Achkhoy, Gudermes and Guerzel-Aul . Rebels launch a new assault against Grozny (August 6, 1996) , fights rage in the city (August 7, 1996) . Federals lose control over Grozny and entrench themselves in Grozny's two airports Severny and Khankala (August 8, 1996) . The new secretary of the Russian Security Council, General Alexander Lebed, goes to Chechnya and enters into talks with the military chief of the rebels Aslan Maskhadovs. A first Russian-Chechen agreement is signed in Novye Atagui (August 22, 1996) . Russians evacuate the mountains of Chechnya. Lebed and Maskhadov sign a second agreement in Khasavyurt (Daghestan). The secessionists accept to delay (the year 2001) the definition of the status of their Republic, in exchange Moscow evacuates its troops from Chechnya (September 2, 1996) . The campaign of Chechnya 1994-1996 is closed.

After the death of Dudayev, the Chechen resistance splits up quickly in several tens of autonomous armed groups, everyone controling its own territory. Chechnya is transformed into a loose coalition of feudal fiefs in the style of the Middle Ages. Moscow has more and more difficulties negotiating. After being elected Chechen President (January 27, 1997) , Aslan Maskhadov will never manage to impose his control on all armed formations. Two factors explain the second Russian intervening in Chechnya (since 1999): kidnapping and trade of the human beings that was generalized on the Chechen territory and the aggression of Daghestan by Chechen wahhabis.

The campaign of Daghestan and the Chechnya's second war (1999-2001).
The first serious clashes between Russian forces and Chechen fighters occur in the Northern Daghestan (May 28, 1999) . The Chechen fighters of Khattab resume the fighting and get in the Northern Daghestan in several places (June 2, 1999) . The Chechen incursion is repeated (June 17, 1999) . Daghestani wahhabis, helped by Chechen fighters, announce the introduiction of the sharia in their villages: Echeda, Gakko, Guigatl and Avgali, that they proclaim an "Islamic territory" (August 1st, 1999) . Fights begin between Russian soldiers and Chechen fighters near to Echeda (August 3, 1999) . Several hundreds of Chechen Islamists cross the Daghestani border and seize of the villages Ansalta and Rakhata (August 7, 1999) . The Daghestanis create militias and resist to the Chechen incursion. Fights rage in the environs of Ansalta, Rakhata and Tando (August 19-21, 1999) . The federals dislodge Islamists from the Daghestani villages Tando, Rakhata, Shadroda, Ansalta, Ziberkali and Ashino (August 24, 1999) . The Chechen rebels withdraw to Chechnya. The new Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin goes to Daghestan (August 28, 1999) . The federal forces launch an attack against a wahhabi stronghold in Daghestan (Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi) (August 29 - September 3, 1999) .

A series of bomb attacks occurs in Moscow (August 31, 1999), in Buynaksk (Daghestan) (September 4, 1999), again in Moscow (September 9, 1999), another time in Moscow (September 13, 1999), and in Volgodonsk (September 16, 1999) . Putin states that the terrorists hide on the Chechen territory and are supported by Chechen extremist forces of (September 15, 1999) . While speaking about the terrorists, the prime minister says he is ready "to pull up this abomination with roots" .

Finally the federals push back the Bassayev's and Khattab's rebels toward Chechnya. The Russian forces are concentrateted near to its border (September 21, 1999) . The Russian Air Force bomb the Grozny's airport and 15 Chechen villages (September 23, 1999). Poutin affirms that the Russian forces will pursue terrorists and pronounce the sentence that makes him famous: "If they hide in the toilets, we will bump off them in the bog" (September 24, 1999) .

The federal troops enter in Chechnya (September 30, 1999), and gain 5-30 kms of its territory (October 2-3, 1999). The federals occupy all the left bank of Terek (October 5, 1999), seize Garagorski (October 15), and approach Grozny (October 29, 1999). The Afghan talibans offer a military and financial help to the Chechen, whereas Albanians of Kosovo cross Georgia to rejoin the Chechen fighters (late October 1999) .

An anti-Maskhadov's opposition is formed in Chechnya around the Chechen mufti Akhmad Kadyrov, that gave to the federals without fighting Gudermes, and the former mayor of Grozny, Beslan Gantemirov, freed recently from a Russian prison (November 6, 1999). Gantemirov begins to form the Chechen militias that will fight on the sides of the federals during the battle for Grozny (November 30, 1999) .

The Russian victorious advance continues in Chechnya. The federal forces take Asinovskaya (November 12, 1999), Bamut (November 12, 1999), Novy-Sharoy (November 16, 1999), Achkhoy-Martan (November 19, 1999), Argun (December 3, 1999) and Urus-Martan (December 8, 1999). The battle for Grozny begins (December 13, 1999), intensify (December 24, 1999). The assault widespreads (December 26). The federals progress slowly in Grozny (December 28). At the same time, the rebels launch a counteroffensive in Argun and Shali (January 9, 2000) that ends in a failure. The battle for Grozny ends by a retreat of the city by the rebels, but they are conducted toward minefields: about hundred fighters are killed or mutilated (February 6-7, 2000).

Rebels launch a new counteroffensive in Komsomolskoye (March 5-10, 2000) and resume guerrilla warfare. Thus, in ambushes made by Chechen, 43 Russian soldiers (March 29, 2000) and 15 soldiers are killed (April 23, 2000). A truck full of explosives and conducted by a kamikaze commando (two Chechen women), explodes in Alkhan-Yurt, killing 17 Russian soldiers, according to the separatists (June 7, 2000).

Poutine appoints the Chechen mufti Akhmad Kadyrov as administrator of Chechnya (June 12, 2000). Guerrilla warfare continues in Summer and Fall 2000. In December 2000, the Russian forces launch an important offensive in the mountains, carrying a deadly strike against the rebels.

The actuality.

The present situation is like the situation in 1995. The guerrilla is entrenched in mountains (chiefs of war Shamil Bassayev and Khattab), whereas a pro-Russian Chechen administration is formed in the plain. Analyzing the two personnalities of this administration Beslan Gantemirov and Akhmad Kadyrov, we can conclude that they are pro-Russian only strategically. As other Chechen chiefs of war, they have got their own armed formations, recruited in theirs teypes, and their own strongholds (Urus-Martan for Gantemirov, Gudermes for Kadyrov).

Beslan GantÚmirov, who is again appointed mayor of Grozny is a separatist militant from 1991. In 1991 during the Chechen revolution he commanded the National Guards on the side of Dudayev, who later appointed him mayor of Grozny. However, GantÚmirov passes to the anti-Dudayev opposition in 1993 after the conflict about the oil income. He unites around him most of the armed forces of the anti-Dudayev opposition and participates in assaults against Grozny in Fall 1994. After having collaborated in the pro-Russian Chechen administration, in 1995, he is arrested, judged and convicted to jail in Moscow. He is freed in 1999 and forms the Chechen militia, that participate in the assault of Grozny. Gantemirov has bad relations with Kadyrov, with whom he shared zones of influence (Grozny being under the control of Gantemirov, Gudermes is controlled by Kadyrov).

Adept of Sufism, Akhmad Kadyrov is a longstanding sworn enemy of wahhabis. The first armed clashes between wahhabis and Soufis take place in Gudermes in July 1998. In summer 1999, Kadyrov created a tariqatist regiment (Soufi) to fight against wahhabi threat in Chechnya. It is difficult to suspect Kadyrov of pro-Russian feelings, because he personnaly fought against the federals in 1994-1996. During some episodes, he supported the Chechen President Maskhadov in his opposition to Movladi Udougov, ideologist of a Chechen-Daghestani Islamist "Nation of Islam", and to Shamil Bassayev, who supported militarily this movement. But, during the Bassayev's incursion into Daghestan, Maskhadov doesn't disapprove of it, and when the federal troops enter in Chechnya, he allieswith the wahhabis. However, Kadyrov, dismissed by Maskhadov, goes to Daghestan, where he begs pardon to Daghestani brothers. The separation becomes more important after the rapprochement of Maskhadov with Gulf's oil-monarchies and with Pakistan, who probably finance the Chechen resistance. Maskhadov and Yandarbiev in 1999 and 2000 visit many times these countries, but also Turkey, where, it seems, their families took refuge.

In early 2001, Moscow stopped all talks with Maskhadov and refused to recognize him as Chechen president. At the same time, some Chechen groupings insist on the organization of Chechen presidential elections in order to elect a legitimate president, with whom Moscow would be able to negotiate. Boris Nemtsov, leader of the Union of the Right Forces, proposes his plan of settlement of the crisis in Chechnya. He proposes to transform Chechnya from presidential republic into a parliamentary republic, where all teypes would be represented, because the president cannot be elected democratically by all the Chechen, who are dominated by clan's interests. According to Nemtsov, the Chechen government have also to represent the teypes. He thinks that it is necessary to appoint provisionally as administrative chief of Chechnya a Governor-General, like in the czarist time.

Boris Nemtsov also proposes the partition of Chechnya, into plain and mountain. The first part would be included in the Territory of Stavropol, the second part would be proclaimed a "rebel territory", that would be surrounded by a unpenetrable border. This proposition to divide Chechnya in two parts has been already made in 1991 by the Russian Nobel Prize Winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and evoked repeatedly by Cossack leaders in 1996, 1997 and 1998. In summer 2000, a former mayor of Moscow Gavriil Popov spoke about the partition. This only solution to the Chechen conflict is not yet approved by the Russian administration, that tries to stamp out the guerrilla warfare by closing the border with Georgia and by introducing the visa principle for the Georgian citizens going to Russia.

The Kistins, Chechen ethnic group of Georgia, have been evoked very often like separatists' rear guard. Medias affirm that Khattab plans to create a wahhabi enclave in the Pankisskoye Gorge in Georgia, where the Kistins live. Observers indicate that Khattab's fighters control 17 villages in this zone, adjacent to Chechnya, while proclaiming their capital a village of Duisi. An islamist movement Al-Kharameyne counts on Khattab in the propagation of the wahhabism in Caucasus following the same script as the talibans in Afghanistan. The Chechen fighters control the Pankisskoye Gorge since 1998, and projected in summer 2000 to proclaim the autonomy of the Georgian Akhmety District (where the Kistins live), but decided to delay this project.

Finally the only solution to the Chechen conflict proceeds in two stages. The first stage consists in collaboration with the plain's teypes (which is in part realized after the recruitment of Kadyrov and of Gantemirov). The second consists in the partition of Chechnya, by isolation of its mountainous part with the rebels that are entrenched there.

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